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The outbreak of direct hostilities between Israel and Iran in June represents one of the most significant geopolitical escalations in the Middle East in recent history. What began as a calculated pre-emptive strike by the Israel Defense Forces against Iranian nuclear facilities, under the codename Operation Rising Lion, swiftly evolved into a multi-theater war involving cyber, air, and naval engagements.

Within days, the United States entered the conflict through Operation Midnight Hammer, employing more than 125 aircraft and seven B-2 Spirit bombers — the latter dropping 14 bunker-buster bombs, 30,000 pounds each, against Iranian nuclear infrastructure. U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine described the operation as the “largest B-2 operational strike in U.S. history.”

Iran retaliated through a mixture of ballistic missile and drone strikes, as well as cyber attacks. It would have loved to utilize the firepower of its once robust network of armed non-state proxies in the region — Hizballah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Palestinian Territories, the Houthis in Yemen, and the militias in Iraq — but it couldn’t because Israel had done a terrific job of massively degrading their military capabilities (at least Hizballah and Hamas). During the brief but intense Iranian-Israeli confrontation, those proxies remained largely silent either because they couldn’t get into the fight in a meaningful way or because they were unwilling due to domestic political constraints.

While a fragile ceasefire was brokered after 12 days of combat, the nature of the conflict underscored the transformation of modern warfare — hybrid, decentralized, and fought across physical and digital domains.

Multi-Domain Combat in Action

The Israeli military’s initial operation demonstrated unparalleled coordination of stealth aircraft, intelligence, cyber disruption, and psychological warfare. More than 200 sorties, involving F-35I Adir and F-15I Ra’am aircraft, struck over 100 targets across Iran, including nuclear sites at Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow. These kinetic actions were preceded by months of intelligence-gathering, sabotage, and cyber intrusions executed by Mossad, the Israeli foreign intelligence agency, and Israel’s Unit 8200.

In parallel, Israel’s air superiority campaign is reported to have suppressed more than 70 Iranian surface-to-air missile systems, paving the way for deeper strikes. The United States entered the fray days later, targeting deeply fortified Iranian sites using Massive Ordnance Penetrators launched from B-2 bombers. These strikes inflicted damage on key enrichment support structures, but there is an intense debate at the moment about the level of damage and whether Iran still has enriched uranium. Based on early intelligence, European officials claimed that Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile is largely intact. However, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said he was unaware of any intelligence suggesting Iran had moved any of its highly enriched uranium to shield it from U.S. strikes.

Simultaneously, Iran retaliated by launching anywhere from 370 to 550 ballistic missiles and over 1,000 drones against Israel, complemented by cyber operations against Israeli critical infrastructure. Israel claims that the vast majority of the strikes were intercepted by its integrated and multi-layered air and missile defense system (with a 90 percent interception rate) — the Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow systems, all of which were assisted by American Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense batteries. However, the sheer scale of the attacks — unique in Israel’s history — revealed stress points in Israel’s defensive grid.

Cyber Warfare

Judging by the level of synchronization of cyber actions with kinetic campaigns, the Iranian-Israeli war is a reminder of how cyber warfare is now a core domain of military strategy, not merely a supplement. Both Iran and Israel experienced the limits of cyber deterrence, particularly where private sector networks were inadequately protected.

Indeed, cyber operations played a pivotal role on both sides. Israel initiated the conflict with a cyber barrage that disabled Iranian radar systems, electronic warfare stations, and communications. Conversely, Iranian hackers targeted Israeli power grids, train networks, and digital infrastructure, with varying degrees of success.

Operational Successes and Shortcomings

Israel’s tactical victories were marked by the achievement of rapid air dominance, high interception rates against Iranian missile barrages, and the disruption of Iran’s command-and-control structure. U.S. kinetic strikes reinforced the impression of an overwhelming technological edge. Civil preparedness, with Israeli civilians reacting swiftly to warnings and occupying shelters, further limited casualties and infrastructure damage. Iran’s ballistic missile attacks killed 28 people — all but one of them civilians — and wounded over 3,000.

Multi-domain integration — particularly the fusion of cyber, electronic warfare, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and kinetic firepower — allowed Israel to operate with tempo and precision. Intelligence-led targeting, coordinated with Mossad’s human intelligence network, ensured that Israel’s initial strike had strategic depth and psychological impact, especially in the targeted killing of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps senior commanders including Saeed Izadi, a veteran commander who led the Palestine Corps of the Quds Force, and Behnam Shahriyari, commander of the Quds Force’s Weapons Transfer Unit.

Despite these successes, the conflict exposed limitations in strategic overreach, proxy elimination, and escalation control. Iran’s proxy forces, though badly hurt, still had capabilities that could have been used to support Iran’s campaign. Hizballah’s much reduced but continued missile capacity exposed the difficulty of destroying entrenched non-state actors with conventional force.

The Israeli defense grid experienced signs of fatigue. Batteries had to be rotated and reloaded at an unsustainable pace, underscoring the need for scalable and autonomous missile defense systems. Iran’s cyber retaliation also demonstrated that even a state as cyber-capable as Israel remains vulnerable without a robust civilian digital defense strategy.

The effectiveness of American bunker-buster bombs against hardened sites is very much unclear. U.S. President Donald Trump claimed the strikes against Iran “completely and totally obliterated” its ability to produce nuclear weapons. Jeffrey Lewis, a weapons and nonproliferation specialist with the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, argued that the attacks do not appear to have destroyed Iran’s nuclear program. A classified U.S. intelligence report was leaked to several U.S. media outlets suggesting that the U.S. strikes damaged but did not eliminate Iran’s nuclear capacity. Further, an intercepted call between Iranian officials was leaked to the media: These officials reportedly said they were surprised the U.S. attack on the nuclear facilities had not been larger and more damaging. Absent a comprehensive bomb damage assessment by the U.S. government (which could take weeks for the military to finish and release), it is hard to tell whether the bombs fully destroyed the nuclear facility at Fordow.

Lessons for the Future

The June 2025 conflict between Israel and Iran yielded a range of critical doctrinal insights for modern military planning. It not only reaffirmed the continuing relevance of conventional capabilities but also underlined the importance of cyber integration, information dominance, strategic precision, and alliance cooperation in 21st-century conflict scenarios. From this conflict, we derive nine lessons.

One, try not to fight alone (especially if you have powerful friends). Israel’s ability to execute Operation Rising Lion and maintain a credible deterrent posture in the face of Iranian retaliation would have been significantly impaired without the support of strategic partners — chief among them, the United States. The June 2025 conflict underscored the strategic, operational, and technological benefits that arise from such alliances. Direct American involvement sent an unambiguous message of alliance solidarity. U.S. military assets were deployed rapidly, demonstrating America’s unique capacity for global strike operations. More importantly, U.S. forces provided critical missile defense support through the deployment of several kinds of advanced missile defense batteries in both Israel and the Gulf region. This operational integration allowed Israel to concentrate its Iron Dome and David’s Sling systems on civilian areas, knowing that U.S. systems could help shield military installations and broader regional assets. Such cooperation extends well beyond munitions — it reflects deep interoperability, joint planning doctrines, and shared intelligence frameworks.

Two, establish air superiority. Air superiority remains the cornerstone of operational success, but it ought to be supplemented by cyber dominance, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance integration, and electronic warfare. Israel’s early success in neutralizing Iranian radar systems and air defenses enabled its air force to carry out long-range operations with minimal resistance. The seamless coordination of stealth aircraft, real-time intelligence feeds, and electronic suppression created the conditions necessary for operational freedom.

Three, ensure strategic precision. The success of targeted strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure demonstrated the enduring power of strategic precision. Israeli and U.S. forces, operating in concert, were able to destroy critical enrichment sites, disable support systems, and severely degrade Iran’s nuclear research timeline. Although the most deeply buried facilities such as Fordow withstood direct assault due to hardened construction, surrounding infrastructure was incapacitated. These strikes delayed Iran’s nuclear progress by an estimated 18–24 months and served as a reminder that targeted, intelligence-led operations can deliver disproportionate strategic effect. Israel’s access to U.S. satellite surveillance, AI targeting support, and shared signals intelligence significantly enhanced the precision and tempo of its strikes. Joint intelligence assessments also enabled rapid battle damage assessment and facilitated strategic decision-making within hours of engagements.

Four, master drone warfare. Drones have evolved into a strategic weapon system, capable of saturation, deception, and long-range attritional warfare. Iran’s drone swarms, while largely intercepted, tested the limits of Israel’s multi-layered air defenses and forced Israel to expend high-value interceptors on low-cost unmanned aerial vehicles. Future warfare will require investment in AI-driven targeting algorithms, directed energy weapons, and low-cost drone countermeasures to neutralize large-scale unmanned threats without depleting strategic resources.

Five, anticipate and embrace hybrid warfare. Hybrid warfare — encompassing physical, cyber, informational, and psychological domains — is now the prevailing model of conflict. Israel’s campaign combined high-value kinetic strikes with psychological operations, digital disinformation management, and cyber operations, sowing disarray within Iran’s command structure and public communications. In this new battlespace, success demands anticipatory intelligence, rapid adaptability, and strategic messaging that shapes both battlefield perception and international opinion.

Six, invest in integrated air and missile defense. Had Israel not done precisely that, it would have been in a world of trouble. Iran’s missile and drone attacks would have caused much more significant infrastructure damage and greater casualties. Thanks to U.S. sponsorship and Israeli technological ingenuity, Israel boasts one of the most effective air and missile defense systems in the world. This is a lesson the Gulf Arab states should learn and should have learned a long time ago. These countries should come together on this issue and waste no more time creating a shared early-warning system across the Gulf region. Such a system, which the Gulf Arab states would have to obtain from Washington, is the most critical element of integrated air and missile defense — the first layer of defense. It provides fast and uninterrupted reporting on the location and trajectory of ballistic missile launches so countermeasures can be prepared, and civilian populations can be warned and protected. Imagine if the Iranian ballistic missile strike on June 23 on the U.S. military base of Al Udeid in Qatar had been more extensive. It would have required the assistance of Doha’s neighbors — except that they can’t help, at least effectively, because they are not on the same network or information-sharing platform. They need a common regional missile defense architecture of satellite and radar data to counter Iran’s missile and drone threats.

Seven, contain and ideally eliminate the capabilities of proxy forces. For years, Iran’s reliance on Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and Iraqi militias has created layered threats across four geographic theaters. These actors not only expanded the battlefield but allowed Tehran to wage indirect war while oftentimes retaining plausible deniability. For states such as Israel, countering this asymmetric depth requires a broader doctrine encompassing sustained counter-proxy disruption, regional coalition-building, and legal frameworks for preemptive and retaliatory action against non-state belligerents.

Eight, don’t downplay psychological operations. Psychological operations and strategic information management were key features of Israel’s campaign. These tools were used not only to paralyze Iranian response networks but also to potentially influence decision-makers, shape public perception, and manage escalation on both domestic and international fronts. In the early hours of Operation Rising Lion, Israeli operatives reportedly sent direct warnings to Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps officers moments before airstrikes. While designed to reduce collateral casualties, these calls also served a psychological purpose inducing fear, confusion, and mistrust within Iran’s military command. By suggesting intimate knowledge of individual movements and locations, Israel sowed doubt in the security of Iran’s internal communications and protection protocols. The psychological impact of Israeli precision strikes (particularly the assassination of high-ranking revolutionary guard officers) was felt beyond the military. Civilian populations across Iran reportedly experienced waves of panic, fueled by social media reports of air incursions, disrupted communications, and conflicting government statements. This internal disquiet, while not amounting to civil unrest, applied pressure on Tehran to consider de-escalation pathways. In effect, psychological operations operated as a non-kinetic force multiplier, amplifying the strategic effects of kinetic strikes without expanding battlefield footprints.

Nine, rethink deterrence. The war demonstrated that deterrence in modern warfare is no longer a static binary. It is fluid, multifaceted, and cumulative. Israel’s ability to deliver high-impact strikes while defending its population centers showcased a powerful deterrent capacity. However, Iran’s survival, retaliation, and proxy endurance highlight the difficulty of achieving strategic resolution through force alone. Future deterrence ought to be calibrated through visible military capability, political clarity, alliance cohesion, and control over the escalation ladder.

The Changing Character of Regional War

The 2025 conflict between Israel and Iran signaled a profound shift in the character and conduct of regional warfare. It reaffirmed the centrality of alliances, psychological operations, and precision targeting, while also highlighting the evolving role of strategic deterrence and information warfare in shaping outcomes.

The successful targeting of Iran’s nuclear facilities — executed with surgical precision and coordinated through joint U.S.–Israeli intelligence — proved that well-executed, pre-emptive action can yield measurable delays in adversarial weapons development. These strikes were not only militarily effective but psychologically disorienting, undermining confidence within Iran’s defense establishment and signaling Israel’s reach, capability, and intent.

Just as importantly, the campaign revealed that influence is now a force multiplier. Strategic communication, public diplomacy, and psychological operations achieved effects far beyond the battlefield. They neutralized panic at home, destabilized enemy cohesion, and helped shape global narratives. As such, psychological operations and information dominance now sit alongside airpower and cyber warfare as core pillars of modern national defense.

Equally critical was the role of strategic partnerships. Without U.S. intelligence, missile defense assets, and military coordination, Israel would have struggled to execute a campaign of such scale and precision. The conflict reinforced the idea that no nation, however capable, can operate alone in a multi-domain war. Success depends on interoperability, trust, and shared strategic objectives among allies.

The June 2025 conflict was not merely an episode in the Israeli-Iranian rivalry — it was a glimpse into the future of warfare. It showcased the fusion of conventional and unconventional tools, the necessity of operational resilience, and the unpredictability of asymmetric threats. It also raised enduring questions of how tactical victories can deliver strategic outcomes (which Israel has failed to do), and how nations can adapt to a battlefield that is no longer bound by geography or traditional rules of engagement.

As strategists and decision-makers assess the legacy of Operation Rising Lion and Operation Midnight Hammer, they should look beyond the metrics of destruction. The real measure of success lies in whether enduring security, stability, and deterrence have been achieved or whether this was merely the opening salvo in a new era of protracted, hybrid confrontation. The battlefield of tomorrow is not coming — it has already arrived. And only those nations that can operate across domains, at pace, and with strategic discipline will endure.

Bilal Y. Saab is senior managing director of TRENDS US and a former senior advisor for security cooperation in the U.S. Department of Defense.

Darren D. White is a retired U.K. servicemember and a former military intelligence operator. 

Image: IDF Spokesperson’s Unit via Wikimedia Commons